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Building on the theory of humor advanced by Yves Cusset in his recent book Rire: Tractatus philo-
comicus, I argue that we can understand the phenomenon in terms of what Jean-Luc Nancy, following 
Roland Barthes, has called the exemption from sense. I attempt to show how the humorous sensibility, 
understood in this way, is entirely incompatible with the experience of others as contemptible. I conclude 
by developing some of the normative implications of this, focusing specifically on the question whether it 
is ever morally permissible to treat others with contempt. 
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 According to the theory that has been predominant throughout the vast majority of 
the history of Western philosophical reflection, laughter is best understood as expressing 
the laugher’s feeling of superiority over the target of her laughter. This view goes back at 
least to Aristotle’s Poetics, where comedy is defined as “an imitation of men worse than 
the average,” and more specifically of men who are ridiculous.1 A similar idea is taken up 
by the Roman rhetorician Quintilian, who suggests in his Institutio Oratoria that 
“laughter is never far removed from derision.”2 Among early modern philosophers, 
Thomas Hobbes gives what is probably the most straightforward expression of the idea, 
arguing that “laughter is nothing else but a sudden glory arising from a sudden 
conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmities of others, 
or with our own formerly.”3 There are two points that different versions of this view, 
typically referred to in the contemporary literature as the Superiority Theory, have in 
common. First, they attempt to show how laughter presents the laughing subject to 
herself as distanced in a specifically practical sense from the target of laughter. Charles 
Baudelaire illustrates this point especially vividly: our laughter at others’ misfortunes—
for example, their slipping and falling on ice or their tripping at the edge of a pavement—
is most basically an expression of unconscious pride. What we are really thinking is 
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something like “‘I don’t fall, I don’t; I walk straight, I do; my footstep is steady and 
assured, mine is. You won’t catch me being stupid enough not to see where the pavement 
ends, or that there is a pavingstone in my way.’”4 The distance established by the laugh, 
though, is not just the distance of a rank ordering; it is not merely the case that the 
laugher experiences herself as higher on some scale of value than the target of laughter. 
And this is the second point: the distance opened up in laughter establishes, or at least 
runs the risk of establishing, a relation of contempt. In laughing at other persons, we 
abandon what Stephen Darwall calls the second-person standpoint. We do not make 
ourselves answerable to them within relationships characterized by mutual respect; the 
targets are given rather within a distance of reflection, as objects rather than as genuine 
partners in dialogue. This point is emphasized by Hobbes and by Samuel Pufendorf, who 
both treat laughter directed at others as a sign of contempt and thus as incompatible with 
the kind of sociability that the natural law obligates us to promote.5 
 The Superiority Theory is no longer the most widely accepted account of 
laughter. Indeed the idea that laughter necessarily expresses feelings of superiority 
probably strikes many of us today as so plainly false that we wonder how it could have 
been accepted for so long as the correct account. Nonetheless, there is one element of the 
theory that I believe is importantly right: laughter can and often does distance us from 
others, suspending to some degree our participation in the intersubjective, practical 
world. And this distancing certainly can manifest itself in relations of contempt. What I 
want to argue in this paper, though, is that it can just as well give rise to a very different 
kind of ethical sensibility, one that is entirely incompatible with contempt. Following the 
argument that Yves Cusset advances in his recent book Rire: Tractatus philo-comicus, I 
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will begin in what follows by emphasizing the way in which humor—in contrast, for 
example, to ridicule, sarcasm, and raillery—opens up a space of wonder where what 
becomes manifest is the simple fact of our being-with. Cusset suggests that this humorous 
sensibility should be understood as an epoché in the phenomenological sense, where the 
imperatives of the given, everyday practical world are put in suspense. I will argue, 
though, that this sensibility can be understood more adequately in terms of what Jean-Luc 
Nancy, following Roland Barthes, has called the exemption from sense. Next, I will show 
how the humorous sensibility, understood in terms of the exemption from sense, is 
incompatible with the experience of others as contemptible. I will conclude by 
developing some of the normative implications of this, focusing specifically on the 
question whether it is ever morally permissible to treat others with contempt. 
Laughter as Expression of Wonder: Devos contra Democritus 
 In order to bring out the sensibility he thinks is proper to humor, Cusset contrasts 
the laughter of Democritus, accounts of which come down to us from the apocryphal 
letters of Hippocrates, with the laughter provoked by the twentieth-century French 
humorist Raymond Devos. Democritus, of course, was known in antiquity as “the 
laughing philosopher.” His laughter, though, was not a source of joy for the citizens of 
his native Abdera, who saw in it a potential symptom of madness. The problem was not 
merely that Democritus liked to laugh, but rather that he seemed to laugh excessively and 
at things that were not funny. Concerned for the well being of their renowned native son, 
the Abderites appealed to Hippocrates, who they hoped would be able to discover the 
causes of his laughter. Asked explicitly why he laughed, Democritus insisted that it was 
because the conduct of the Abderites in their everyday lives truly was ridiculous: they act 
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irrationally and childishly, constantly running this way and that, pursuing a thousand 
different projects without a single, overarching aim. They aspire to become great lords, 
commanding whole populations, when they are unable even to command themselves. 
They desire children, but then send them far away as soon as they are old enough. They 
chase wealth, but once they have it they either spend it foolishly or hide it away, thereby 
rendering it useless. Each day they are thwarted by their own vices, which they never try 
to correct. How could one not laugh at such ridiculousness? Hippocrates eventually 
comes around to this point of view, attributing Democritus’ laughter not to madness but 
rather to his having the wisdom to see things as they truly are. Cusset rejects this 
assessment, though. What is truly at the origin of Democritus’ laughter, he thinks, is “one 
of the greatest passions of philosophy,” viz., contempt for ordinary people and their 
everyday affairs.6 The attitude of Democritus, and of philosophy generally, stems from “a 
slight displacement” whereby the philosopher ceases to participate directly and 
straightforwardly in human affairs, setting up instead a distance of reflection from which 
everyday life comes to appear ridiculous.7 
 In one of his most popular sketches, titled “Où courent-ils?” (“Where are they 
running?”), Raymond Devos describes a scene very similar to the one that provoked 
Democritus’ contemptuous laughter. He begins by telling his audience that he has just 
returned from a strange city where everybody runs. (As in most of Devos’s work, the 
humor consists in an extended play on words, in this case on the various idiomatic uses of 
the verbs courir and marcher.) When Devos asks one of the city’s residents why all these 
people constantly run around like fools, he is told that it is because they are indeed fools. 
“But what is it that makes all these fools run?” asks Devos. The answer: “Everything. 
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There are some who are attending to the most pressing matters [courent au plus pressé]. 
This one is running for glory. That one is on the road to ruin [court à sa perte].” “But 
why do they run so fast?” asks Devos. “To save time.”8 
These strange people who run this way and that not really knowing what they are 
doing are Abderites, and their conduct makes us laugh. But the laughter provoked by 
Devos is importantly different from Democritus’ laughter. The key to understanding the 
difference appears near the beginning of Devos’s sketch: “When I entered the city I 
walked normally. But when I saw that everyone was running, I started running like 
everyone else, for no reason.”9 Unlike Democritus, Devos situates himself among the 
people whose conduct appears so strange, allowing himself to be taken up into the 
general movement of foolishness that he describes. Our laughter is not the laughter of 
ridicule or mockery; instead, what makes us laugh is the fact that Devos “does not stop 
running while being surprised that everyone runs.”10 All of us, Devos shows us, are 
Abderites, throwing ourselves into a thousand projects that, from a slightly displaced 
point of view, appear at least a little bit silly. But the fact that our projects are not quite as 
serious as we typically take them to be, that we cannot establish their genuine value on 
the basis of any higher truth or rationally compelling end, does not entail that they are 
ultimately meaningless. The laughter of Democritus, Cusset suggests, is essentially 
nihilist in that it is founded on a perception of everyday human affairs as amounting to 
nothing. The laughter provoked by Devos, on the other hand, has its source in the 
completion of this nihilist vision, reducing nihilism itself to nothing: it’s true, our 
everyday affairs do not really have the weighty seriousness we typically attribute to them, 
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but this fact itself need not be experienced as weighty.11 The laughter that stems from this 
realization is the laughter proper to humor. 
Epoché and the Exemption from Sense 
 In his paper “Penser, S’étonner, S’éclater: Théâtre Clownesque et Étonnement 
Philosophique,” Cusset characterizes the humorous sensibility as a kind of epoché in the 
phenomenological sense of the term. The humorist is able to “provisionally bracket the 
natural attitude of consciousness, with its naïve belief in the objective existence of what 
appears to it,” including the kinds of social norms and practices that we take for granted 
in our everyday lives.12 The slight displacement that the humorist effects in our 
perspectives helps to make manifest the humorousness of these norms and practices. This 
displacement is unlike the one effected by Democritus, who situates himself outside, or 
more precisely above, the sphere of everyday human concerns. In the presentation of 
humor, both the humorist and the audience continue to situate themselves within the 
everyday social world, but in such a way that its taken-for-granted character is 
suspended. The principle of humor, Cusset thinks, consists precisely in this “sincere 
participation but without deep adherence.”13 We laugh because it is our own world that 
we come to perceive differently, as less weighty. 
 There are good reasons, beyond the ones Cusset suggests, for thinking of the 
humorous sensibility as a kind of epoché. First, the world that becomes manifest under 
the epoché is not some other, truer world; it is exactly the same world that is given within 
the natural attitude. The only alteration that the epoché introduces into our experience is 
the suspension of our natural-attitude orientation toward the everyday world as something 
that is unproblematically, objectively there, independent of the cognitive acts in which it 
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is given. This suspension enables us to focus our attention on the manifold ways in which 
the world is given to consciousness. And this, in turn, helps to restore our sense of 
wonder at the world. By “loosening the intentional threads that connect us to the world,” 
the epoché “reveals the world as strange and paradoxical.”14 This is exactly what happens 
in humor: by loosening—but not outright breaking—the ties that connect us to our 
everyday projects and to their obvious, taken-for-granted importance, the humorist 
presents them in an ever so slightly altered light, provoking our wonder and thus our 
laughter. 
What I want to argue, though, is that we can also profitably understand the 
humorous sensibility in terms of what Jean-Luc Nancy, borrowing from Roland Barthes, 
has called the exemption from sense. Doing so, I believe, retains the benefits of 
understanding it as a kind of epoché, but it also helps bring to light aspects of the 
humorous sensibility that are especially relevant for our thinking about ethical 
experience.  
Roland Barthes introduces the idea of the exemption from sense in his book 
Empire of Signs, which is devoted to the semiology of Japanese culture. He approaches 
the idea by means of an examination of bunraku puppet theater, and specifically of the 
means it uses to present the sense of the action it depicts. What makes bunraku so 
different from much of Western theater, according to Barthes, is the fact that it makes no 
effort to conceal the artifices of its presentation. Each of the puppets is controlled by 
three different puppeteers, all of whom are fully visible to the audience. And off to the 
right of the stage, again fully visible, is the chanter, who voices each of the characters and 
provides the narration. Also visible is the script from which the chanter reads; it is placed 
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on a lectern directly in front of him. The effect of all this is to present meaning as a 
surface phenomenon, spread out across all the different signifying elements that are 
visible on the stage. The meaning of the play, according to Barthes, is given in a flash 
that illuminates nothing but its own taking place.15 In Western theater, by contrast, the 
artifices of manifestation—the machinery, the script, the lighting sources, etc.—are 
typically concealed from the audience. The signifying apparatus is effaced in favor of the 
signified. This produces an effect of transcendence: the meaning of the play is not given 
as a fleeting surface event, but rather as gathered together and anchored outside the space 
of the performance in an origin that is supposed to be “unique [and] indivisible.”16  
In his book Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity, Jean-Luc Nancy 
builds on this point, suggesting that we locate this unique and indivisible origin of sense 
in the vouloir dire—literally the willing to say—of the signifying subject. To remain with 
the example of the theater, we could say that the various signifying elements—the actors’ 
words, gestures and costumes, the lighting, the scenery, etc.—have their true meaning 
gathered together and anchored in the playwright’s meaning-bestowing intention. Sense, 
in this case, would be a “self-instituting projection of the will,” an externalization of a 
deep and concealed interiority.17  
This understanding of sense in terms of vouloir-dire strongly suggests three 
comportments toward sense that will help to clarify the meaning of the expression 
“exemption from sense.” First, it suggests an orientation toward a kind of sense that is 
given to us in the form of an injunction: “to make sense, to produce or recognize its 
instance and form—would be first and foremost an imperative. (It can be shown to be the 
essence of the Kantian imperative.)”18 Nancy does not flesh out his argument here, but 
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the basic idea seems clear. For Kant, moral sense cannot be read off the surface of the 
empirically given world. We cannot discover what ought to be the case, in other words, 
merely by observing what is the case. Central to Kant’s transcendental idealism, rather, is 
the idea that moral sense has its origin elsewhere, in the legislative faculty of pure 
practical reason. As rational beings, we cannot help but intend moral sense in accordance 
with the moral law, even when doing so works to our disadvantage. Because moral sense 
is never fully realized in the empirically given world, it is present to us as an ought-to-be, 
and thus as an injunction. Second, and closely related to this, is the comportment toward 
moral sense as a unique sense.19 Again, we can understand this point with reference to 
Kant, for whom there is one and only one source of genuine moral sense: the categorical 
imperative. Of course Kant gives different formulations of the imperative, but he insists 
that these are “at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law” and that each 
contains all the others.20 Finally, the understanding of sense in terms of vouloir-dire 
suggests a conception of the practical subject as master of moral sense. According to 
Nancy, “the wanting-to-say commanded by sense always consists, in sum, in a wanting-
to-have-said (“I have said” is the word of the master).”21 Because moral sense has its 
origin in our own faculty of pure practical reason, we should never be in any sincere 
doubt about what we are morally required to do. Kant expresses this idea of moral 
mastery especially clearly when he writes that “the most common understanding” can 
always determine what is morally required “quite easily and without hesitation.”22 As 
sources of the moral law, each of us “knows very well how to distinguish in every case 
that comes up what is good and what is evil, what is in conformity with duty or contrary 
to duty….”23 
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The laughter of Democritus stems from this imperative of mastery. He sets 
himself at a distance from the everyday lives of his fellow Abderites, determining the 
sense of their behavior unilaterally and with perfect self-confidence. The Abderites 
themselves, he concludes, go about their day-to-day business without understanding the 
true sense of what they are doing or of what is most worth doing. Democritus takes 
himself to be the master of the sense that the Abderites lack. Sitting comfortably in the 
judge’s seat, he recognizes “quite easily and without hesitation” the many ways in which 
their behavior is objectively ridiculous.  
The exemption from sense, by contrast, would consist in the lifting of this 
obligation to position ourselves as masters of a uniquely authoritative sense. It is a 
suspension, in other words, of the imperative to get a distance from naïve, everyday 
experience and to discover the true, self-present meaning that would provide its measure. 
Instead of trying to issue definitive verdicts on the sense of the situations we find 
ourselves in, we are called upon to find “a renewed, refined, and ever more finely honed 
word,” one that is “always closer to its birth than its closure, always more governed by its 
saying than by its said, by its reserve more than by its last word.”24 In the exemption from 
sense, we find ourselves oriented toward sense as shared, as something that emerges most 
originarily right at the level of our openness to each other: “what makes sense,” in the 
most literal sense of the idiom, “is one person speaking to another.”25 This slight 
displacement in perspective gives others to appear not primarily as particular instances of 
significant kinds—as uneducated, as men or women, as Abderites, etc.—but rather as 
singular, and thus as wonderful.26 It is this kind of experience, Nancy argues, that is 
captured in the common saying “people are strange:” the other is given most originarily 
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as “incomparable or inassimilable, not because it is simply ‘other’ but because it is an 
origin and a touch of meaning…. You are absolutely strange because the world begins its 
turn with you.”27 
The laughter of Devos, I want to argue, arises from the lifting of the imperative of 
sense. Instead of distancing himself from the everyday experience of the Abderites, 
setting himself up as their judge, Devos runs right along with them. Just as in the case of 
bunraku puppet theater, we see the sense of their lives lighting up at the surface, right at 
the level of their exposure to each other. Nobody, including Devos, is the master of this 
sense. The sensibility that arises from the suspension of this imperative is very much like 
what Cusset characterized as the completion of the nihilist vision: the world comes to 
appear as lacking the weighty seriousness of foundational sense, but this lack itself is not 
experienced as weighty. 
The Humorous Sensibility and Contempt 
 As these references to Kantian imperatives and to the singularity of the other 
suggest, the humorous sensibility, thematized in terms of the exemption from sense, is in 
some respects also an ethical sensibility. In what follows, I would like to focus 
specifically on the way in which the humorous sensibility is entirely incompatible with 
the experience of others as contemptible. To show how this is the case, it will be 
necessary to describe as precisely as possible what it means to hold someone in contempt. 
I will begin, then, by isolating four features that psychologists of emotion and 
philosophers working on the ethics of contempt have typically considered to be essential 
to the phenomenon. 
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 First, contempt tends to manifest itself in avoidance of the contemned. Among 
psychologists of emotion, Agneta Fischer and Ira Roseman have been the most influential 
advocates for this view, arguing that contempt is best understood as belonging to what 
they call the exclusion family of emotions.28 Instead of confronting perceived wrongdoers 
and calling them to account for their bad behavior, as we do in anger, we simply exclude 
them from our social networks. Philosopher Kate Abramson agrees with this 
characterization, arguing largely on the basis of our commonsense understanding of what 
contempt means: if “I tell you that I’m contemptuous of Joe but spend a good deal of 
time with him, you would likely begin to wonder whether I really find him 
contemptible.”29 And finally, Thomas E. Hill clearly has this idea of contempt as 
avoidance in mind when he characterizes the phenomenon as “a deep dismissal, a denial 
of the prospect of reconciliation, a signal that the conversation is over.”30 
Second, contempt is a hierarchizing attitude: when we contemn someone, we 
regard her as low in comparison to ourselves. From the very beginning, psychologists of 
emotion who have written on contempt have been nearly unanimous on this point. In his 
1977 book Human Emotions, for example, Carroll Izard described contempt as “the 
feeling of being superior, of being better than someone, some group or some thing,” 
adding that it might also be “the feeling that one’s family, one’s culture, or one’s society 
is superior to and better than someone else’s.”31 And Hugh Wagner included the “feeling 
of superiority over another person (or of the other’s inferiority)” as the second element in 
his three-part working definition of contempt.32 In her groundbreaking paper “Contempt 
as a Moral Attitude,” Michelle Mason expands on this idea, arguing that contempt is best 
understood as “presenting its object as low in the sense of ranking low in worth as a 
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person in virtue of falling short of some legitimate interpersonal ideal of the person….”33 
Likewise, Macalester Bell characterizes contempt as “a demoting emotion that presents 
its target as having a comparatively low status.”34 And Kate Abramson describes 
contempt as being directed toward “persons held in low esteem simply as persons.”35  
 Third, contempt is a globalizing emotion. This is closely related to the previous 
point: when we judge the target of our contempt to be low, what we have in mind is 
always a person or group of persons taken as a whole, and never some particular acts that 
have been attributed to the person or group or some particular aspect of their character. 
This point is given special emphasis by Michelle Mason and Macalester Bell. As Mason 
notes, the global focus of contempt is strongly suggested by the ways we talk about it in 
everyday English: “one typically holds _____ in contempt, regards _____ with contempt, 
or expresses contempt for _____, where what fills the blanks are particular persons or 
groups of persons.”36 It would be very unusual to say that we hold a person’s having 
embezzled from his employer or his having committed adultery in contempt. It is of 
course perfectly natural to say that we resent the person’s having embezzled or his having 
committed adultery, but that is something different from contemning them. What we 
contemn are the authors of these acts, the embezzler or the adulterer as whole persons. 
Macalester Bell expresses the same point when she writes that “contempt is a response to 
perceived badbeing whereas hard feelings like resentment and guilt are responses to 
perceived wrongdoing.”37 
 Finally, contempt is a third-personal attitude. This point is emphasized especially 
clearly by Stephen Darwall, who argues that when we contemn someone, we characterize 
her, reducing her to a contemptible quality that defines who she is essentially.38 When we 
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blame someone, by contrast, we engage with her second-personally: we regard her as an 
equal member of the moral community, willing and able to make herself answerable to 
the charges of moral wrongdoing we bring against her. Blame, in other words, is a form 
of address directed to the one who has wronged us, or who we believe has wronged us. 
Like all reactive attitudes, blame comes with an implicit RSVP: we give the other person 
the opportunity to respond to our address, perhaps to apologize for her having wronged 
us, but also perhaps to provide an excuse or to present us with an argument that what she 
had done was not morally wrong at all.39 Contempt, on the other hand, is a judgment 
about the contemned; it does not come with an implicit RSVP. If it is an address at all, it 
is addressed to “other cognoscenti who have the same superior view of the contemned’s 
contemptible character.”40 
 There can be little doubt that Democritus’s laughter expresses contempt, in this 
sense of the term, for the Abderites. As we have seen, his relation to them is entirely third 
personal: his laughter is not addressed to them, inviting them to defend or to justify their 
ways of life to him. Rather, his laughter expresses a characterization of the Abderites as 
ridiculous. Insofar as his laughter constitutes an address at all, the addressee is 
Hippocrates, whom Democritus regards as his equal and thus as worthy of second-
personal engagement. The Abderites themselves, from Democritus’s point of view, are 
clearly beneath him. And this judgment is intended to be global in scope: its object is not 
some particular, isolated quality, such as the Abderites’ weakness in money management 
or their failure to successfully subordinate their various projects to one overarching end. 
What is ridiculous, rather, is the Abderites taken as whole persons and as a group.  
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The laughter that stems from the humorous sensibility is very different in all of 
these respects. In his sketch “Où courent-ils?” Raymond Devos does not characterize the 
Abderites, reducing them to qualities that are taken to be definitive of them. Neither does 
he look down on them, judging them to have fallen “short of some legitimate 
interpersonal ideal of the person.” Instead, he runs right along with them, expressing 
wonder at the lightness of the meaning that happens between them. This wonder, and not 
our sense of our own superiority, is what elicits our laughter. As we have seen, humorous 
sense is a phenomenon of the surface: it arises nowhere else than at the level of our 
being-together. In the humorous sensibility, then, others are given, in Nancy’s terms, as 
singular, as incomparable and inassimilable origins of meaning. This sensibility is simply 
incompatible with the attitude of contempt. 
Normative Implications of the Humorous Sensibility 
 In this final section I would like to develop some of the implications of the 
humorous sensibility, understood in terms of the exemption from sense, for our thinking 
about the ethics of contempt. Specifically, I want to argue that this account supports a 
broadly, but not entirely, Kantian view of the moral impermissibility of treating others 
with contempt. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that “to be contemptuous of 
others (contemnere), that is, to deny them the respect owed to human beings in general, is 
in every case contrary to duty.”41 This position may seem quintessentially Kantian, but in 
fact it is entirely in keeping with a broad consensus on the question of contempt that had 
gone back at least a century and a half. Thomas Hobbes, for example, argued in On the 
Citizen that the natural law obligated us to refrain from showing “hatred or contempt of 
another by deeds, words, facial expressions, or laughter.”42 And in his Treatise on Ethics, 
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Nicolas Malebranche insisted that contemning others was not only wrong, but “the 
greatest of wrongs.”43 What is unique to Kant’s view of the ethics of contempt is the 
combination of this view with a strong commitment to the claim that some people truly 
are contemptible. In the Lectures on Ethics, for example, he argues that we dispose of our 
humanity, and thus render ourselves contemptible, when we sell parts of our own bodies 
or allow ourselves to be used for the sexual pleasure of others. In performing such acts, 
we renounce our own subjectivity, reducing ourselves to the level of mere things.44 In 
practicing other vices, such as drunkenness and gluttony, we render ourselves 
contemptible by reducing ourselves to the level of the non-rational animals.45 And in the 
Doctrine of Virtue, Kant argues that the vices of lying, avarice, and servility are contrary 
to inner freedom and human dignity; to adopt them is to “throw oneself away and make 
oneself an object of contempt.”46 This commitment gives rise to a very difficult problem 
for Kant’s view: if the moral law, which has its source in the legislative faculty of pure 
practical reason, shows some persons to be objectively contemptible, then how can that 
same law forbid us from contemning them? What makes this problem even more difficult 
is the fact that the command not to contemn is categorical, not hypothetical. This means 
that the reason for the prohibition on contemning others cannot be prudential. It seems on 
Kant’s account, then, as if pure practical reason commands us unconditionally to 
disregard the moral sense that it itself legislates. How can we make sense of this? 
 I believe that the modified version of Cusset’s account of the humorous sensibility 
developed above gives us some valuable resources for resolving this tension in Kant’s 
position, and more importantly for clarifying our own thinking about the ethics of 
contempt.47 For Kant, as well as for the vast majority of writers on the subject, contempt 
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is a globalizing judgment. This is clear from the passages cited above: by practicing 
certain vices we throw ourselves away or reduce ourselves to the level of mere things. It 
is also clear in his definition of contempt as “judging something to be worthless.”48 From 
within a moral sensibility shaped by what Nancy characterized as the imperative of 
unique, authoritative sense, these kinds of globalizing judgments may seem perfectly apt. 
But the humorous sensibility, characterized by an exemption from the imperative of 
sense, gives us a vivid example of how globalizing moral judgments fail to capture whole 
persons. By a slight displacement of perspective, we can come to recognize in even the 
most contemptible people a difficult-to-articulate something that is passed over in our 
moralizing judgments. This excessive something is present to us in the experience of 
wonder that humor can elicit: others are given not primarily as instances of moral kinds—
as liars, manipulators, gluttons, etc.—but as singular origins of the meaning of the world. 
And as we have seen, this experience of others is simply incompatible with an attitude of 
contempt. 
 Do we have an obligation, then, to cultivate a humorous sensibility, comporting 
ourselves toward others in something like the way Devos comports himself toward the 
Abderites? Should we treat the open-ended, excessive, surface dimension of sense that 
this comportment reveals as overriding the kind of fixed, authoritative, and unique sense 
that is given from the Democritean point of view, in something like the way the moral 
law in Kant always overrides prudential considerations? The answer to these questions, I 
believe, is no. Phenomenologically, the humorous sensibility is not given as necessarily 
overriding all other sensibilities. It is given, rather, in the way that Bernard Williams 
thinks the sense of obligation is actually given in our real, everyday experience: simply as 
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one sensibility among others.49 Moreover, there are certainly cases in which the 
humorous sensibility is not called for. Although the humorous sensibility is incompatible 
with the third-person perspective that is characteristic of contempt, it is not itself a 
second-person perspective. It is not, in other words, a sensibility in which others are 
given as equal members of a moral community, answerable to us in cases where we feel 
they have wronged us, but also authorized to hold us accountable for our actions. But 
surely this kind of comportment toward others, and toward ourselves, is sometimes more 
appropriate than the attitude of “sincere participation but without deep adherence” that 
characterizes the humorous sensibility. 
 If this is correct, then we can agree with Kant that our attitudes toward very bad 
people are irreducibly conflicted, that we have strong reasons to treat them with contempt 
and that we also have strong reasons not to. But I do not believe we should go quite as far 
as Kant in concluding that the reasons not to contemn necessarily override the reasons to 
contemn. If a financial advisor has tricked our elderly and vulnerable grandparents out of 
their life savings, for example, we cannot know “quite easily and without hesitation” that 
we would wrong him by forming a global judgment of him as low and by forgoing 
second-personal relations with him. Of course this financial advisor, like everyone else, is 
more than his bad character; he is also, as Nancy says, a singular, inassimilable origin of 
the world. But we cannot rule out in advance the possibility that the wrongdoer’s 
singularity may not be the most important moral consideration, especially for those who 
have been adversely affected by his bad acts. All the same, we can be sure that it is a 
consideration that always matters at least to some extent. And when we situate ourselves, 
like Democritus, firmly in the judge’s seat, we are very likely to lose sight of this. 
	 19	
Occupying this position, we run a very great risk of committing ourselves to strongly 
one-sided, self-aggrandizing, and unjust moral judgments and of closing ourselves off 
from the possibility of modifying those judgments in response to new evidence. Even in 
cases where our judgments of contempt are indeed appropriate, all things considered, we 
should still be careful to resist the temptation to reduce the wrongdoer completely to his 
bad character traits. The humorous sensibility, I believe, helps us to do exactly that: by 
effecting an exemption from the imperative of unique, authoritative sense, and by 
bringing into relief the singularity and incomparability of our fellows, it helps us to resist 
our dangerous tendency to get too comfortable in our position as masters of moral sense, 
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